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Understanding online safety through metaphors: UK policymakers and 
industry discourses about the internet 
 
Scholars analysing discourse around online risk and safety have often focused on the 
representation of (particularly young) internet users in public debate. A question that 
has received less attention in the literature is how online safety discourses 
conceptualise what the internet is. This article extends previous research, by exploring 
how key institutional participants in this debate use metaphors of the internet in their 
narratives about online safety. It suggests that metaphoric language that constructs 
the internet as a separate place from daily experience legitimises separate measures 
to control online risk and closes off possible connections with managing offline risk. 
 
The study analyses policy discourse in a period when the UK government was 
preparing to introduce regulation against online harms. This was the first time the UK, 
or any major Western state, established direct regulation in this area. As will be 
discussed subsequently, the norm in Europe until the mid-2010s was self and co-
regulation of the internet. The article analyses the government’s proposal as well as 
documents by key players around the same period, to compare their discourse at this 
moment of veritable shift in policy.  
 
The article uses discourse analysis to investigate how metaphor was used in selected 
documents published by the UK government, Ofcom (the UK’s telecommunications 
regulator), and two Social Network Services (SNS) companies, which operate both in 
the UK and internationally. It suggests that these institutions do not construct online 
risk as a problem embedded in social experience, but as a phenomenon that happens 
somewhere else, in a separate online space. I argue that this representation distances 
the problem from the real world and obscures its connection to behaviour in other 
realms of life. This is significant because our daily experience and interaction with the 
social world are increasingly mediated digitally (Fernback 2007; Carrington 2017).  
 
Moreover, the article finds that whereas for the policy makers studied the solution lies 
in direct regulation of this online space, the SNS industry discourse views internet 
users as responsible for their own safety. This long-established liberal perspective has 
its roots in decades of self-regulation in this industry, but it clashes with the current 
move towards state intervention.   
 
Regulation of the internet 
 
Direct regulation, namely regulation of an industry by a state-appointed body that 
enforces its own legal rules (Marsden 2011), had not been a preferred option for 
regulating the internet in Europe until the mid-2010s. This was because state 
regulation was perceived as too rigid to respond to a complex and changing converged 
media sector, states were not perceived as having the insider knowledge to regulate 
the internet, whereas the global companies in this sector are not based within the 
jurisdiction of a single state (McLaughlin 2013). 
 
Instead the preferred way of regulating the internet in its early years was self-
regulation, where service providers and platforms collectively create their own codes 
of conduct and commit to upholding them – the industry itself creates and enforces 
the rules (Marsden 2011; McLaughlin 2013). Self-regulation measures to address 
online risk include internet companies using software that detects and filters 
inappropriate content on their platforms, tools for users to report misconduct, human 
or automated content removal, help pages and educational material for users (deHaan 
et al. 2013). In SNSs’ view, effective safety mechanisms teach users how to control 
their information sharing whilst maintaining freedom of speech (Jorgensen 2017); and 
have them moderate each other by signalling to the company which posted content is 
inappropriate, thus shifting the responsibility for identifying such content from the 
company to the user (Milosevic 2016, 5173). Indeed established SNSs’ published 
guidelines often represent responsibility for user safety as a task shared between the 
SNS and the user community (Milosevic 2016). This rationale, argues Staksrud 
(2016), outsources responsibility for citizens’ welfare from institutions to citizens 
themselves, denies them their citizen right to protection from harm, and makes it reliant 
on how they interact with the technology. 
 
Self-regulation was the norm until the late 2000s, after which point Europe turned to 
co-regulation, whereby statutory regulators delegate responsibility for regulation to the 
industry but agree the rules with the industry and maintain an oversight of their 
implementation (Marsden 2011). This direction of travel from self-regulation towards 
gradually more involvement of the state seems to have continued, at least in the UK, 
in light of both the increasing role the internet plays in daily life and a decline of faith 
in self-regulation to alleviate online safety concerns.  
 
In April 2019, a formal turning point for UK internet regulation policy, the Department 
for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the Home Office published the 
Online Harms White Paper, with its proposals to set out “the world’s first framework 
designed to hold internet companies accountable for the safety of their users” (Skelton 
2020). Eventually this led to the appointment of Ofcom in late 2020 as a national 
regulator for online harms. Its role would be to shape rules on behalf of the state, 
monitor and oversee their enforcement by the industry, and apply sanctions. 
 
Although this shift to direct regulation remains in progress at the time of writing, this 
article focuses on the period surrounding the publication of the White Paper. It aims to 
establish how metaphoric discourse both in the Paper and in publications by public 
bodies and industry players around that time may legitimise or oppose particular 
solutions. It looks at a key moment in the evolution of regulation and explores how 
discursive constructions of what the internet is have implications for how it is regulated. 
 
Discourses of online safety 
 
Much academic literature analysing online safety discourses focuses on the safety of 
young people, who are seen as particularly vulnerable. This research has found that 
public discourse emphasises the risks rather than the opportunities young people 
encounter online (Livingstone et al. 2018). Such risks include exposure to harmful or 
inappropriate content and contact with individuals who may harm them, but less 
attention is given to young people’s own potentially problematic conduct online 
(Livingstone et al. 2014). Bulger et al (2017) suggest that internet safety discourse 
internationally has tended to view young people as innocent, in need of protection from 
risks and harms on digital platforms, but they argue that this fails to acknowledge 
evidence of young people’s agency in these environments. 
 
The same rationale that characterises broader public discourse is also reflected in 
media coverage of internet safety. Literature specifically analysing mediated discourse 
agrees that the mass media focus on the negatives and harms of the internet (Ponte 
et al. 2009; Haddon and Stald 2009), view internet users as “innocent” (Haddon and 
Stald 2009), “passive” (Ponte et al. 2009), potentially “untrustworthy” and in need of 
“monitoring” in an online environment (Fisk 2016; Hartikainen 2016), and only 
sometimes as potential “aggressors” (Ponte et al. 2009). The kinds of risks the media 
report tend to involve content and contact risks (Haddon and Stald 2009), as these 
were defined above. Experts and institutional voices are heard more often than users 
in media reports (Ponte et al. 2009; Hartikainen 2016). 
 
However perceiving young people as active agents might be important when 
educating them on risk. Encountering risk can be essential in learning to protect 
oneself, scholars argue, and media literacy attempts should pay attention to how 
people deal with risk and develop the ability to cope (Staksrud and Livingstone 2009; 
Fisk 2016).  
 
Similarly to the public and media discourses discussed above, policymakers broadly 
tend to see internet risks as isolated from young people’s social contexts. Livingstone 
et al. (2018) however stress that young people’s experience alters as the digital 
ecology changes and new generations have these technologies integrated into their 
lives at increasingly earlier stages. They call for research to focus “no longer [on 
users’] relationship with the internet as a medium but, more profoundly, [on] their 
relationship with the world as mediated by the internet in particular and changing ways” 
(Livingstone et al. 2018, 1117).  
 
This article speaks to this context, by examining whether and to what extent the policy 
and industry discourses it analyses discuss online risk as part of users’ relationship 
with the world. The article makes an original contribution by analysing metaphoric 
discourse to address this question. As seen in the literature reviewed above, previous 
research on internet safety discourses has described common themes within these 
discourses, but it has not looked at how their use of metaphor constructs this problem 
and its solutions. However, how we conceptualise solutions for online risk stems from 
how we understand what the internet is in the first place. The present article takes a 
step back to analyse policy and industry solutions within the context of what we know 
about different metaphoric ways of understanding the internet. 
 
Metaphors and the internet 
 
Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) cognitive linguistic theory of conceptual metaphor views 
metaphor not just as a figure of speech, but as a way of understanding concepts in 
day-to-day experience. This involves constructing one conceptual domain, namely the 
target domain, in terms of another, the source domain, from which vocabulary is 
borrowed and transferred. Their premise that people not only speak but also think of 
target domains in terms of source domains has been criticised on the grounds that 
such mappings are partial and not all properties of a domain are transferred to the 
target; that transferring vocabulary between domains does not necessarily reflect how 
these domains are mentally represented; or that more detail is needed to explain the 
mental processes involved in metaphorical mapping (see Thibodeau et al. 2019, for a 
detailed discussion). However several studies have collectively shown that, although 
linguistic patterns cannot necessarily predict how people will behave, “metaphors can 
influence how people think about a wide range of sociopolitical issues” and do reflect 
patterns of thought (Thibodeau et al. 2019, 9).  
 
Metaphor frames issues by selectively highlighting some of their aspects and 
concealing others and these frames can influence thinking within political and social 
institutions (Ryall 2008). Metaphors about technology have the potential to set the 
direction and the agenda for internet research and policy (Wilken 2013). For this 
reason, “it is crucial to re-examine our use of particular linguistic constructions in policy 
making” (Markham 2003,14). 
 
Markham (2003) identifies three metaphors for understanding the internet – as a tool, 
as a place and as a way of being – which she suggests represent an evolution in how 
we experience it. Seeing the internet as a tool involves perceiving it as an extension 
of our physical selves, that allows us to do things like accessing information located 
far away. Seeing the internet as a place, involves understanding it as a separate 
environment where we interact “online”, beyond the physical world. A view of the 
internet as a way of being, by contrast, suggests that there is no distinction between 
living on and off line, as separate “places”, but the internet is just one “way one learns 
about, makes sense of, and ultimately knows the social world” (Markham 2003,10). 
This metaphor constructs the internet as one of the ways available to interact with 
others and do things, which is not separate from, nor less authentic than our offline 
experience (Markham 1998,168). Consequently, risks that we may face offline, such 
as scam, theft, terrorism or bullying, also exist online because they are part of the 
same social world. 
 
Of these three metaphors, the one that constructs the internet as physical place has 
long been “fundamental to how virtual technologies are framed and understood” 
(Wilken 2007, 49). In the 1980s and 1990s, spatial metaphors became common in 
describing this new technology, for instance the information superhighway and 
cyberspace metaphors (Nunes 1995; Blavin and Cohen 2002). Each spatial metaphor 
has ideological implications for what can and should be done with the internet: the 
superhighway metaphor legitimates external regulation and emphasises the 
ephemerality of online content;  whereas the cyberspace metaphor precludes 
regulation and emphasises the boundless nature of the internet (Blavin and Cohen 
2002). Similarly, the metaphoric construction of the internet as a platform, which is 
common in the discourse of social media companies, emphasises its empowering, 
democratising role and, at the same time, limits these companies’ liability for what is 
published on their “platforms”, thus averting external regulation (Gillespie 2010). 
Indeed, as the above authors demonstrate, “in so far as metaphor is intertwined with 
rhetoric, metaphor is never innocent” (Wilken 2013, 642) because it is part of an 
attempt to persuade. Internet services that position themselves as platforms are not 
necessarily successful in avoiding regulation when political pressures prevail; indeed 
social media platforms are currently being targeted by European regulation. This 
though does not change the fact that the associations the platform metaphor carries 
are part of a rhetoric that attempts to deflect responsibility from these companies. 
 
Although the superhighway and cyberspace metaphors became redundant over time, 
the internet as a separate physical space remains a dominant metaphor (Matlock et 
al. 2014). However, constructing the internet as separate from reality conceals that it 
does not create problems that aren’t also encountered in the real world (Blavin and 
Cohen 2002). Indeed as the internet gradually becomes central to how people do 
things in their daily lives, Blavin and Cohen (2002) predict a move towards a metaphor 
of the internet as “real space” (or as a way of being in Markham’s terms). Nunes (1995, 
317) goes further to suggest that the internet will one day replace real place and 
become “more real than real”, as our experience of life is increasingly mediated 
through it. Mobile smart technology providing constant online access is already 
contributing to this (Wilken 2013). 
 
Similarly, Carrington (2017) highlights that “online” and “offline” are themselves 
metaphors which are getting increasingly old, because the internet is no longer 
something we “connect” to some of the time via a modem, but it is there, “ready-to-
hand”, constantly. “All our lives are technologically mediated in some way” (Carrington 




This article applies insights from the above research on internet metaphors to an 
analysis of current debates on online safety. It addresses two questions: 
 
RQ1 Which metaphors inform the way policy makers and SNS companies discuss 
online safety in their respective documents?  What does this reveal about how they 
understand potential solutions to online risk? 
RQ2 Who do policy makers and SNS companies represent as responsible for 
addressing online risk? 
 
It uses qualitative discourse analysis of documents produced around the period of the 
publication of the UK government’s Online Harms White Paper. This was the first time 
the UK government proposed direct regulation of the internet and the article analyses 
the proposal itself, as well as material about online safety published by other public 
and private players in the period before/after this proposal. The purpose is to compare 
the discourse of the government at this official turning point to that of other players in 
the field in the same period. More specifically, this article analyses: 
 
The UK government’s Online Harms White Paper, presented to the UK Parliament 
in April 2019  by the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and the 
Home Secretary, setting out plans for establishing a new regulatory framework for 
online safety. These plans were subsequently put out for public consultation. 
 
The UK’s Office for Communications (Ofcom) Addressing Harmful Content Online 
paper, published in September 2018 and presenting the regulator’s perspective on 
online safety regulation. Ofcom was at the time the regulator for UK broadcasting, and 
also the main candidate to be allocated the role of regulating online services. 
 
The UK Council for Internet Safety (UKCIS) Digital Resilience Framework, published 
in September 2019. This aimed to help internet companies in supporting resilience to 
risk. The UKCIS is part of the government’s Department for Digital, Culture, Media and 
Sport, but brings together technology companies, government and the third sector to 
cooperate on online safety. Its members include digital media companies such as 
Facebook and Google, as well as Ofcom and other key players. 
 
All press releases and blog posts posted on the corporate websites of TikTok and 
Instagram, which had online safety as their subject and were published between May 
2019 and February 2020.  
 
All videos included under TikTok’s “You’re in control” online safety tag. These were 
published in November 2019 to educate users on TikTok’s safety features. 
 
These actors represent UK government, regulators, industry bodies and two major 
SNSs which operate both in the UK and globally. TikTok and Instagram were 
specifically selected due to their growing number of users in the period studied 
(Statista 2020a, 2020b) and their popularity among younger users (Ofcom, 2020), 
since the safety of young people is central to these debates.  
 
All the content of the above documents was subjected to discourse analysis. As a 
qualitative method, discourse analysis works with small corpora and delivers an in-
depth explanation of how language is used to reproduce a particular “system of values 
and beliefs” (Scannel 1998, 256). It is not about measuring or statistically representing 
elements of texts but about interpreting them: the researcher’s task is to build a 
convincing explanation of the text based on theoretical and empirical arguments 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Its validity relies on the systematic application of 
the analytical tools chosen, on citing excerpts to back up the inferences made, on 
reporting any instances that contradict these inferences, and on providing a convincing 
account with evidence from the analysed texts (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).   
 
My analysis focused on two aspects of the language used: metaphor analysis 
(Charteris-Black 2011) and an analysis of transitivity (Richardson 2007). Metaphor 
analysis is based on Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) cognitive linguistic theory of 
metaphor, reviewed in the previous section. I followed Charteris-Black’s (2011) 
empirical approach: this involves reading each text carefully and systematically 
identifying every instance where words or phrases are used with a non-literal meaning; 
then identifying the source domains these were taken from and mapping the 
correspondences between source and target domains (Charteris-Black 2011). The 
target domain I focused on was the internet, so I mapped all metaphoric expressions 
about it to their corresponding source domains. I classified together all excerpts where 
the same source domain was used (instances of the same metaphor) and I present 
the metaphors I identified in the first two findings sections below. I use excerpts from 
among those classified under each metaphor to illustrate how the metaphor typically 
appears in the texts. Conceptual metaphors are in small caps, as is conventional in 
cognitive linguistic theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 
 
An analysis of transitivity involves systematically identifying all the verbs used in a text, 
and their syntactic subjects and objects. This is done to discuss who is presented as 
doing what to whom, who is in subject position controlling action and is thus 
represented as powerful, and who is affected by the actions of others (Richardson 
2007; Fowler 1991). In each of the analysed texts, I identified the syntactic positions 
occupied by the main actors in the safety debate (internet users, regulators and the 
government) in every sentence they were mentioned, I grouped together excerpts 
where the same actors held the same syntactic positions, and I thus identified patterns 
in the different texts. I discuss these patterns in the third findings section below, and I 




The internet as a place 
 
The first finding of the analysis is that the internet is not represented as “a way of 
being” (Markham 2003) by most of the actors involved in addressing online risk. 
Although the internet is increasingly an integral part of everyday life, the main 
metaphor used to describe it in the discourse of policymakers, regulators and the 
industry is that of a place. Going to this “online place” implies that it is located 
separately from offline experience (to “go” somewhere presupposes leaving another 
place behind) and, in this way, the discourse analysed conceals the possibility that the 
risks that exist online may be rooted in the “offline world”. 
 
The metaphor of the internet as a separate place (THE INTERNET IS A PLACE) is dominant 
across all the material analysed. For instance, the Online Harms White Paper 
suggests that: “illegal and unacceptable content and activity is widespread online, and 
UK users are concerned about what they see and experience on the internet” (2019, 
5). “Online” and “on the internet” in this excerpt indicate a place where people go and 
encounter “illegal and unacceptable” content. This leaves them “concerned”, 
presumably because such content is unusual in their offline experience.  
 
Similarly, the White Paper also warns that “if we surrender our online spaces to those 
who spread hate, abuse, fear and vitriolic content, then we will all lose” (2019, 3).  In 
this instance of the place metaphor, it is combined with a war metaphor, whereby the 
internet is represented as a land that can be “surrendered” to an enemy. The enemy 
is those who cause online risk (“those who spread hate, abuse, fear and vitriolic 
content”) and any attempts to deal with online risk are thus constructed here as a war 
against these anonymous individuals. The war metaphor serves to evoke a threat “that 
must be curbed by human intervention”, which is a common rhetorical technique in 
political discourse around technology (Pushman and Burgess 2014, 1697). 
 
Further examples of the place metaphor can be found in Ofcom’s Addressing Harmful 
Online Content report, where “a debate is underway about whether regulation is 
needed to address a range of problems that originate online” (2018,1). “Online” again 
is a linguistic indicator of place in this excerpt, and this time this place is a breeding 
space for problems. Later in the same report, the internet is constructed as not just a 
separate place, but a completely different world: “existing frameworks could not be 
transferred wholesale to the online world” (Ofcom 2018, 4). 
 
In line with the two policymakers’ documents above, the industry documents also 
metaphorically construct the internet as a distinct place. However, whereas in the 
policy documents this place is presented as rather negative, problematic and risky, as 
was seen in the earlier examples, in the industry material the dominant version of the 
place metaphor is that of a more positive “environment”: 
 
“people socialise, explore, create and work in digital environments” (UKCIS 
2019, 1) 
“our Community Guidelines support a safe and open environment for 
everyone” (Instagram 2020a) 
“our platform empowers users to express themselves, inspire others, and have 
fun in a safe and welcoming environment” (TikTok 2019b). 
 
Understandably, in the above examples the industry itself sees the internet as a place 
for self-expression and entertainment, rather than a breeding ground for negative 
experiences. In line with this more favourable deployment of the place metaphor, the 
industry documents also use the spatially-based metaphor THE INTERNET IS A 
COMMUNITY – for example in the second excerpt above. This metaphor involves a focus 
not on the geographical but the social aspect of place, the coming together of people 
to form a cohesive group (Fernback 2007). This positive construction of the internet in 
these documents does not however mean that the industry fails to acknowledge the 
presence of risk online, as will be discussed in a later section.  
 
The only material analysed where the construction of the internet as a separate place 
is challenged are the “You’re in control” videos that TikTok uses to promote online 
safety among its young users. Similarly to the examples analysed so far, these videos 
also feature THE INTERNET IS A PLACE metaphor. However this place is here constructed 
in terms of day-to-day “offline” experience, not as different from it. TikTok’s videos are 
mostly silent and feature short scenarios metaphorically presenting online risk as 
annoying situations in everyday places. One of the characters has popcorn thrown at 
them at a party, another is annoyed by a fellow passenger putting up their smelly feet 
on a bus seat (Figure 1), a further character is intimidated by a large dog (Figure 2). 
These pests represent unsolicited messages, offensive behaviour or bullying online.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
By contrast to the previous examples, the spatial metaphor here connects online and 
everyday experience. These instances are the closest any of the analysed material 
came to THE INTERNET IS A WAY OF BEING metaphor, as these videos invite users to 
“experience life and technology on the same plane” (Markham 2003,10). At the same 
time however, the videos trivialise online risk by making analogies with comical offline 
experiences (smelly feet, scary dog), which play down online harms’ seriousness and 
impact on victims. 
 
The solutions given in the videos are initiated either by the recipient of the annoying 
behaviour or their peers: a bus driver throws a pair of shoes for the offender to cover 
their bare feet, another character throws negative words down a toilet. Internet users 
are represented as in control of their own and each other’s experience. This is 
consistent with SNS’s longstanding approach to online safety, as discussed in an 
earlier section, and is an example of a tendency to outsource institutional responsibility 
for reducing risk to citizens, positioning them as making decisions previously made by 
institutions, and making it their fault if they fail to protect themselves (Staksrud, 2016). 
They may be granted agency, but they are also treated as consumers of a product, 
not as citizens who have a right to be protected from harm (Milosevic 2016; Staksrud 
2016). 
 
The internet as tool 
 
A second finding of the analysis is that the UK government’s White Paper, setting 
national policy on internet safety, constructs the internet as a tool that may fall in the 
wrong hands and be used to harm. This is significant because framing the internet in 
such a way portrays risk as intentionally caused by wrongdoers who take advantage 
of the “tool” to harm innocents, and not as something that emerges from social 
behaviour. As such, the government adopts an understanding of online harm as an 
external threat to (British) users and not as something they may cause themselves.   
 
THE INTERNET IS A TOOL metaphor deployed in the White Paper represents the internet 
as an “extension or prosthesis” (Markham 2003) which allows wrongdoers to extend 
the reach of their evil acts across geographical distance. For example, in one of the 
instances of the metaphor in the Online Harms White Paper: 
 
“Online services can be used to spread terrorist propaganda and child abuse 
content, they can be a tool for abuse and bullying, and they can be used to 
undermine civil discourse” (2019, 12).  
 
This metaphor transfers to the internet qualities normally associated with a tool: it 
helps materialise the intentions of its user and directly affects those on whom it is used, 
in the way that the user intends it to. The metaphor thus carries over connotations of 
control and domination (Warnick 2004) into the target domain of the internet. It also 
carries over the expectation that, like a tool, the internet was created with some 
specific purpose to fulfil (ibid) and other uses of it are wrong. 
 
The metaphor additionally allows the document to construct an anonymous enemy 
who uses this manipulatable “tool” to threaten national safety. In other instances of 
this metaphor, the Online Harms White Paper states that the internet “can be used to 
undermine our democratic values” (2019, 5); “threaten our national security” (2019, 
11); or “threaten our way of life in the UK” (2019, 30). The identity of this threatening 
enemy is concealed through agentless passive voice and nominalisations, but the 
discourse creates an entity for the British government to fight against and thus 
legitimises punitive legislation.  
 
This understanding of the internet as a potentially dangerous tool in the wrong hands 
precludes an understanding of online risk as part of societal behaviour. The tool 
metaphor “separate[s] the technology from its users as well as from the contexts of its 
use” (Koteyko et al. 2015, 480). Users of the internet are absent in the example above 
and have no agency over the “spread of terrorist propaganda”, “abuse and bullying”, 
or over what happens to “civil discourse”. 
 
Taking action against online risk 
 
The previous sections established that in the analysed documents online risk is 
constructed as something happening in a separate place from ordinary experience, 
and as a misuse of the internet by an enemy that needs to be fought against. This 
section will explore who is represented as responsible to undertake this “fight”.  
 
Policy makers and the industry have divergent views on this matter, as these emerge 
from the analysis of their respective documents. Whereas for policy makers the 
solution lies in government initiative and legislation, in the industry documents internet 
users have more agency, supported by the SNS companies themselves. 
 
In the Online Harms White Paper, the British government is constructed as the main 
agent taking action against online risk. Although there are some instances in this 
discourse where regulators and internet companies are also presented as having 
some responsibility, this is presented as a result of the government mobilising them. 
For instance:  
 
“This White Paper sets out government action to tackle online content or 
activity that harms individual users, particularly children, or threatens our 
way of life in the UK” (2019, 30). 
 
“The government will establish a new statutory duty of care on relevant 
companies to take reasonable steps to keep their users safe and tackle 
illegal and harmful activity on their services” (2019, 42). 
 
The main actor controlling action verbs in the two excerpts above is the government 
(and its White Paper via metonymy). This actor is responsible “to tackle” online risk, 
and to “establish” a duty for internet companies. In the second example, companies 
appear in subject position of action verbs too (“take steps”, “keep”, “tackle”) but these 
are all in secondary clauses, resulting from the action of the government (“establish a 
statutory duty”).  
 
The role of internet users in the Online Harms White Paper is overall limited. Users 
appear rarely in the document as subjects of verbs - they are usually affected by the 
actions described in sentences. For example: 
 
“All users, children and adults, should be empowered to understand and 
manage risks so that they can stay safe online” (2019, 85). 
 
“This White Paper sets out a programme of action to tackle content or 
activity that harms individual users” (2019, 6). 
 
In the first example above, users are the subject of an agentless passive (“should be 
empowered”) and the active voice verbs “understand” and “manage”. Although they 
are positioned as “managing” their online experience, this is not possible unless 
another nameless agent enables them (“should be empowered to”). Besides 
“empower” triggers the presupposition that users are currently powerless. In the 
second example, as in many others in the document, users are the object of a verb 
(“harms”) controlled by other actors, in this case by the nominalisations “content” and 
“activity”. On the few occasions in this document where internet users are subjects of 
verbs, these are thought processes (such as “understand” of “feel”) but never action 
verbs. The document does not assign internet users agency over their safety. 
 
In Ofcom’s Addressing Harmful Online Content document, legislation and regulation 
are the agents responsible for dealing with online risk. Once again, internet users are 
powerless. Heavy use of nominalisations excludes human agents from the narrative, 
but the implied agents responsible are governments and regulators. For example: 
 
“New European legislation will increase the level of regulation of online 
video content” (2018, 19). 
 
“We also cover how regulatory and voluntary initiatives have developed 
various protections in certain parts of the online world” (2018, 14). 
 
In both the above excerpts, nominalisations replace human agents (“legislation”, 
“regulatory and voluntary initiatives”) as subjects of action verbs (“will increase”, “have 
developed”). The implied human agents are legislative authorities. Moreover, and 
similarly to the government, Ofcom’s document constructs the public as passive in 
regards to its own safety: 
 
“But there is an intensifying, global debate over how to address the various 
problems that people experience online” (2018,3). 
 
“However, users should be able to trust or, at least, critically assess the 
factual content they view online. People should be able to know who has 
created the content they see” (2018, 30).   
 
In the examples above, users are the subject of mental state/action verbs 
(“experience”, “trust”, “assess”, “know”) but don’t yield any power over their online 
experience. Here users are constructed as in control of what they think, but not in a 
position to do anything about their safety. 
 
Responsibility for causing online risk is not attributed to anyone in Ofcom’s Addressing 
Harmful Content document. Nominalisations (“bullying”, “harassment”, “conduct”) 
replace human agency wherever online risk is mentioned, thus avoiding to identify 
who does these actions. For example, “personal conduct that is illegal or harmful - 
such as bullying, grooming and harassment” (Ofcom 2018,12) does not reveal who is 
the agent of the “conduct”, “bullying”, or “grooming” referred to. This contrasts with the 
discourse of the White Paper examined earlier, which attributes online harms to an 
enemy of the nation. For Ofcom, online harms are therefore represented as 
phenomena (nouns) rather than as actions (verbs). 
 
Clearly neither Ofcom nor the UK Government regulate individuals’ behaviour online. 
These actors’ remit is to regulate the SNS industry, which then enforces measures on 
users. This may to an extent justify why users don’t feature as powerful actors in 
regulators’ documents though, that said, the SNS industry does not feature as very 
powerful either. These documents place policymakers or regulation as key agents in 
securing safety, thus helping to reinforce the need for external regulation. 
 
By contrast to the government and Ofcom documents, which represent users as 
broadly powerless over their own safety, the SNSs’ press releases and safety-themed 
blogs position them in control of their experience:  
 
“Your teen's account can be set to private, meaning their content will only 
be seen by approved followers. They can also block and report abusive 
accounts” (Instagram 2020b). 
 
“It’s also important for our community to look after their wellbeing, which 
means having a healthy relationship with online apps and services” (TikTok 
2020) 
 
In these examples, internet users are in subject position of physical action verbs 
(“block”, “report”, “look after”) affecting themselves and their peers. They are thus 
positioned as powerful actors who can take action to protect themselves against risk. 
Both platforms’ discourse also features several instances where the SNS is in control 
of action that assists users in their effort to protect themselves. For example: 
 
“In addition to features that help you stand up to bullying, we've created new 
ways to help stop bullying before it happens” (Instagram 2020c). 
 
In this excerpt the SNS controls action (“help”) which has users as its object and allows 
them to carry out the action that they control in the secondary clause (“stand up”). 
Although the user is still responsible for standing up to bullying, the SNS contributes 
to this task and controls three action verbs (“help”, “created”, “stop”). Online safety is 
thus a collaboration between companies and users, where the former enable the latter. 
Established SNSs often represent responsibility for user safety as shared between the 
SNS and the user community: previous research revealed that SNSs view user 
communities moderating themselves as “an advanced or evolved self-regulatory 
mechanism”(Milosevic 2016, 5174). This tendency to shift responsibility was formed 
over years of industry self-regulation, as discussed earlier, but clashes with the 
discourse of direct regulation found in the policymakers’ documents, which place 
responsibility on institutions and not on users.  
 
Finally, responsibility for causing online risk is attributed differently in the discourse of 
the two SNS companies: Instagram sometimes attributes responsibility to users for 
causing harm, whereas TikTok avoids this. Like in Ofcom’s document, TikTok’s press 
releases and safety blogs do not present users themselves as causing online harms: 
 
“Harmful or dangerous content, violence, discrimination or hate speech, 
abuse or sexual activity, harassment or cyberbullying, and misleading content 
has no place in the TikTok community” (TikTok 2019a) 
 
Wherever TikTok refers to harmful behaviour, this is in nominalisations (“content”, 
“violence”, “discrimination”, “speech”, “abuse”, “activity”, “harassment”, “cyberbullying” 
in the example above). Using these nouns, instead of the equivalent verbs, represents 
these behaviours as phenomena rather than as someone’s deliberate action. By 
contrast, Instagram occasionally attributes harmful behaviour to its own users: 
 
“Young people face a disproportionate amount of online bullying but are 
reluctant to report or block peers who bully them, so last year we created a 
new feature called Restrict” (Instagram 2020c). 
 
“Peers who bully them” directly attributes responsibility not to some enemy, like the 
government’s White Paper did earlier, but to ordinary users. This avoids representing 
bullying as an abstract phenomenon and is consistent with viewing it as part of social 




Metaphors open up ways of thinking about things by making connections of analogy 
between these things and originally unrelated domains of our experience (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980). At the same time though, when a metaphor becomes the standardised 
way of speaking about an issue, it constructs a system of meaning that pushes back 
other ways of understanding this issue. Spatial metaphors of the internet originate in 
a time when it was a relatively new technology (Nunes 1995), that people accessed 
some of the time to seek information or to have interactions “somewhere else”. 
However, thinking about going online as going to another place discourages an 
understanding of what happens there as behaviour that is also encountered offline.  
 
This article has found that an understanding of the internet as a place separate from 
the ‘real’ world remained dominant in official discourse at a time when the UK was 
taking a major step towards direct regulation of the industry. Moreover it found that UK 
legislators specifically also viewed the internet as a tool that could fall into the wrong 
hands and be used for harm. Such constructions legitimise rules to control this online 
“place” and institutions to “punish” those who intentionally cause harm.  
 
The metaphor of the internet as a separate place was common across both the 
policymakers’ and industry documents. One of the SNSs used the internet “as a way 
of being” (Markham, 2003) metaphor, but only in videos addressing its users. The fact 
that, as opposed to policymakers, SNSs have a responsibility to set rules directly for 
individuals may have influenced this but, even so, this metaphor was relatively rare. 
 
Place and tool metaphors encourage a view of online risk as having different qualities 
from risk in everyday life. They discourage policymakers, regulators and the industry 
from assessing what learnings can be transferred from dealing with harms in other 
realms of life. These discourses therefore restrict policy interventions by obscuring the 
possibility that doing harm online might be one way people do harm within the social 
world and addressing it might involve exploring causes and solutions in society.  
 
The solutions encouraged by the place and tool metaphors are punitive and top-down. 
Dealing with risk people encounter in a place foreign to their ordinary experience, or 
stopping evil wrongdoers using a potentially dangerous tool against the powerless 
both require strict rules to be set and implemented by policing institutions. Intervening 
to prevent people harming others as part of everyday interactions would involve 
engaging with users, consulting them and understanding how these interactions work. 
 
In general the documents analysed either present the perpetrators of online harms as 
enemies of the state (the White Paper), or don’t even refer to them as human actors. 
Online harms are often written about as phenomena without agents. This makes it 
difficult to see them as behaviours that need to be comprehended in order to resolve. 
 
In addition, the findings suggest that the discourse of UK policymakers veers away 
from the industry’s perspective that puts responsibility for online safety on the end 
user. This approach is well-established among SNSs and it is how the industry has 
traditionally managed self-regulation of online safety (Jorgensen 2017; Milosevic 
2016). However the policymakers’ documents examined here put responsibility on the 
state and regulators for addressing online harms and protecting users’ rights. This 
discrepancy between companies’ neoliberal and legislators’ interventionist discourse 
might suggest a disconnect between them, as the UK proceeds with direct regulation. 
 
In an era when the internet is constantly available and we live and manage 
interpersonal and professional relationships through it (Blavin and Cohen 2002; 
Carrington 2017), the distinction between online and offline is perhaps more blurred 
than the analysed documents may suggest.  Our social world is experienced through 
multiple means, some of them physical and some digitally mediated. Perhaps this 
interconnectedness could also extend to thinking about preventing or addressing risk.  
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